THE NEW SKEPTICISM: INQUIRY AND RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE

Paul Kurtz (1925-2012) needs no introduction to the free thought community as his accomplishments are legion.  Kurtz produced dozens of books during his lifetime, of which The New Skepticism is among the best.  Here, Kurtz offers us an overview of the history of skepticism as well as an original approach on how to avoid the pitfalls of traditional skeptical methodology.

Beginning with a discussion of the nature and history of skepticism, Kurtz in turn examines the nature of reliable knowledge, the paranormal, religious claims (including the so-called proofs for a god’s existence), and finally, the practical application of his new ideas.

Kurtz distinguishes the new skepticism from earlier skepticism by establishing the essentially positive nature of this new branch of philosophy.  Motivated by inquiry rather than doubt (which has in traditional skeptical discourse often lead to total negative nihilism), Kurtz’ new approach is thus based on construction rather than destruction, and emphasizes in turn practical usage rather than pompous and unusable theorems.

In his discussion of the ancient Sophists and Pyrrhonists, Kurtz demonstrates how the key tenets of skeptical inquiry were already in place well over two thousand years ago.  Critical examination of evidence, suspension of judgement, and the view that doubt is itself inherently moral in that it had positive effects on the lives of individual skeptics, were essential components of Greek rationalism, buried and forgotten for fifteen hundred years during the Christian Dark Ages.

As he moves down through history, Kurtz explores the murky worlds of subjectivism, Cartesian doubt, and nihilism.  He concludes that most traditional skepticism leads to a mistaken subjectivity that doubts any claims of actual knowledge; i.e. truth is impossible to achieve and reality, if it in fact exists, is ultimately unknowable.

Kurtz, rightly recognizing that this is philosophical suicide that can only give carte blanche to mystical claims and religious “truths”, postulates a skepticism that is eminently more practical, useful, and moral.  Kurtz assures us that, by utilizing empirical testing methods and employing logical standards of clarity and internal consistency, we may indeed arrive at conclusions that are epistemologically tenable.

A case might conceivably be made that Kurtz tries to cover too much ground and that, as a consequence, many of his conclusions are superficial and unconvincing.  For example, his dismissal of laissez-faire capitalism as “largely conjecture” without explaining why will not convince many Libertarians.  He would have done well to avoid economic issues and focused exclusively on supernaturalism and its many dimensions of irrationality.  Likewise, he accords far too little space to Immanuel Kant, one of the seminal philosophers  of the last two hundred years.  This omission is a rather astonishing shortcoming in that Kant’s epistemology, with its emphasis on a totally negative skepticism, formed the foundational basis for virtually all of the philosophical skepticism that followed and which Kurtz decries in this book.  Any understanding of the nihilistic philosophy of the last two  centuries must address Kant’s epistemology.

Despite those shortcomings, The New Skepticism should be essential reading for freethinkers.  It is a groundbreaking work that has the potential for clarifying much of the confusing and unnecessary verbiage that passes for contemporary rationalism.  His positive approach to skeptical inquiry is a refreshing antidote to the generally abysmal state of so much modern philosophy.